The Epistemological Skyhook (Chapter One)
This first chapter introduces the Epistemological Skyhook through several of its historical representatives, as well as similarly structured arguments, namely, those from Epicurus and Kant.
The Epistemological Skyhook, says Slagle, is aimed at determinism and/or naturalism: to formulate, defend, or believe these position generates an undefeatable defeater for these positions such that one should not accept them. That is, these positions are self-referentially incoherent (p.1). They can only be believed if one presupposes some further position or vantage point, one denied by the position in question, from which it can be seen to be true (p. 5). Another way of putting things it is that "the Epistemological Skyhook argues that either naturalism or determinism (or both) lead to skepticism" (p. 8).
Despite the claims of philosopher like Daniel Dennett, this argument is not question beginning. Rather, the argument works from "premises that the naturalist or determinist must presuppose in presenting their theses" (p. 6).
This argument has similarities to other arguments against naturalism, such as the qualia argument or the simplicity argument. These arguments claim that certain features of the mind (our qualitative experience of reality, or the unified nature of our mind/consciousness) are incompatible with naturalism, and so naturalism must be false. However, these sort of arguments, unlike the Skyhook, don't argue that naturalism is self-defeating (p. 7).
The Skyhook is also similar to transcendental arguments, which argue that if an interlocutor's premise entails a conclusion he'd reject, or that if his position entails the rejection of rationality, he is being irrational if he holds to his position. Here, the similarity with the Skyhook is quite clear: the transcendental argument concludes that the opponent's belief ends up defeating itself (pp. 7, 8). In a way, the Skyhook is a combination of the argument forms just summarized: there is some feature of the mind denied by naturalism which must exist if naturalism can even get off the ground.
Slagle begins his historical precis of the argument by taking us back to Epicurus, who argued that determinism is self-defeating. Epicurus writes, "The man who says that all thing come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this [his opponent's assertion] happens of necessity" (p. 10). What is he saying here? The idea is that there is nothing beyond deterministic causation that the determinist can employ as a standard for good reasoning; if determinism is true, both the determinist's belief and his opponent's belief are equally caused. No criticism is possible, since both conclusions are formed by the only sort of means available: causality. Only if logic was a norm which reason could follow - something presupposed in the act of making an argument - could the determinist criticize his opponent: you should believe this, etc. (p. 11). However, rational norms require reason to be a self-motive force, because only a self-motive force is able to conform itself to these norms, and so be at fault if it fails to do so (p. 12). But a self-motive force can't be determined by forces outside of itself.
The pre-critical Kant makes an interesting theistic argument for the subjective necessity of believing that God exists, which mirrors the Skyhooks with which this book is concerned. Kant says that a thing can only be materially possible if there is something actual in which its potentiality is grounded, and anything that is materially possible is, in principle, thinkable or logically possible; likewise, anything that is thinkable or logically possible must be materially possible (i.e., able to exist in virtue of something that already actually exists). From this it follows that one cannot say that, if nothing existed, it would still be possible for anything to be: from nothing comes nothing. Of course, somethings exist and other things are possible, so there must be some necessary being which grounds the basis of the existence of all things, which is God (pp. 13, 14). Now, for Kant, what is possible is thinkable, and vice versa. (p. 14).
But if these claims are true, then if you deny God's existence, then there is nothing that grounds the possibility of anything, and so it would be possible that nothing exist: and so, possible that nothing is possible; if so, it would have to be thinkable, too: and so thinkable that nothing would be thinkable. If you think these conclusions are about as acceptable as saying that it is true that there are no truths, you're following the argument. God, who is the ground of all possibility and thought cannot fail to exist; hence it is not possible that nothing be possible, nor can it be thought that nothing is thinkable. But, naturalism denies the existence of God, and so is lead into these absurdities, which is why it must be rejected (p. 14). Now, Kant only concludes that God's existence must be believed in, or at least presupposed, lest thought become impossible. For him it was a separate matter whether God existed in mind-independent reality (pp. 14, 15).
Likewise, Kant thought he held that free will must be presupposed in order to engage in pure reason. Why is postulating free will necessary to get pure reason under way? Slagle comments that, for Kant, "Discursive thought cannot be explained purely in passive or receptive terms." Rather, what is needed is the ability to engage in a spontaneous act of conceptualization, something of which the mind needs to be aware of doing (p. 15).
What does this spontaneous act of conceptualization consist in? A grasp of the logical connections between premises and a conclusion. It is not enough that good reasons somehow shape our consequent belief; rather, these reasons must also be seen to be good reasons, and the mind conclude on the basis of this awareness. This is the opposite of the mind being compelled from outside of itself. Further, the process of reasoning logically cannot be reduced merely to causation such as that which began prior and external to the reasoning agent, or else we could make no distinction between valid and invalid inference: each would be the necessary effect of their respective causal processes (p. 16). So, in order to believe that my reasoning arrives at its conclusions validly and on the basis of good reasons I have to believe that I am free from external causes (p. 17).
Kant also argues against materialism, which for present purposes we can define as the thesis that it is possible to give a completely material account of thinking (p. 17). Kant's argument works equally well against eliminative materialism, reductive materialism, and non-reductive materialism: if material causality is the driving force behind all reasoning, then the propositional content of my beliefs and my awareness of these and their logical connections are irrelevant to why I adopt the conclusions that I do (p. 18). But surely this undermines any epistemic justification I might have for my beliefs, including my belief in materialism.
Kant also presages Thomas Nagel in arguing for the irreducibly subjective nature of reasoning: the illeminability of I think. For, the active power of reasoning that Kant argues is necessary for reasoning requires that there is a certain vantage point from which I grasps the meaning of premises and sees their logical relations. They will seem to be a certain way to me, and only as such can they function as good reasons in valid reasoning processes. But this first-person perspective doesn't fit into a materialist account of things, which is cashed out in objective, third-person terms. Hence, materialism must deny this first-person perspective which is necessary for reasoning, including the reasoning supposedly leading to materialism, to get off the ground, which is self-defeating (p. 19).
From this chapter, we can see several routes one can take the Skyhook down: normativity, subjectivity, self-origination are integral parts of reason. However, all of these are denied by naturalism and/or determinism.
P.S. I didn't add this in the main body of the essay, but it is worth noting. Grasping reasons as reasons is not the case of merely having another belief.
The Epistemological Skyhook, says Slagle, is aimed at determinism and/or naturalism: to formulate, defend, or believe these position generates an undefeatable defeater for these positions such that one should not accept them. That is, these positions are self-referentially incoherent (p.1). They can only be believed if one presupposes some further position or vantage point, one denied by the position in question, from which it can be seen to be true (p. 5). Another way of putting things it is that "the Epistemological Skyhook argues that either naturalism or determinism (or both) lead to skepticism" (p. 8).
Despite the claims of philosopher like Daniel Dennett, this argument is not question beginning. Rather, the argument works from "premises that the naturalist or determinist must presuppose in presenting their theses" (p. 6).
This argument has similarities to other arguments against naturalism, such as the qualia argument or the simplicity argument. These arguments claim that certain features of the mind (our qualitative experience of reality, or the unified nature of our mind/consciousness) are incompatible with naturalism, and so naturalism must be false. However, these sort of arguments, unlike the Skyhook, don't argue that naturalism is self-defeating (p. 7).
The Skyhook is also similar to transcendental arguments, which argue that if an interlocutor's premise entails a conclusion he'd reject, or that if his position entails the rejection of rationality, he is being irrational if he holds to his position. Here, the similarity with the Skyhook is quite clear: the transcendental argument concludes that the opponent's belief ends up defeating itself (pp. 7, 8). In a way, the Skyhook is a combination of the argument forms just summarized: there is some feature of the mind denied by naturalism which must exist if naturalism can even get off the ground.
Slagle begins his historical precis of the argument by taking us back to Epicurus, who argued that determinism is self-defeating. Epicurus writes, "The man who says that all thing come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this [his opponent's assertion] happens of necessity" (p. 10). What is he saying here? The idea is that there is nothing beyond deterministic causation that the determinist can employ as a standard for good reasoning; if determinism is true, both the determinist's belief and his opponent's belief are equally caused. No criticism is possible, since both conclusions are formed by the only sort of means available: causality. Only if logic was a norm which reason could follow - something presupposed in the act of making an argument - could the determinist criticize his opponent: you should believe this, etc. (p. 11). However, rational norms require reason to be a self-motive force, because only a self-motive force is able to conform itself to these norms, and so be at fault if it fails to do so (p. 12). But a self-motive force can't be determined by forces outside of itself.
The pre-critical Kant makes an interesting theistic argument for the subjective necessity of believing that God exists, which mirrors the Skyhooks with which this book is concerned. Kant says that a thing can only be materially possible if there is something actual in which its potentiality is grounded, and anything that is materially possible is, in principle, thinkable or logically possible; likewise, anything that is thinkable or logically possible must be materially possible (i.e., able to exist in virtue of something that already actually exists). From this it follows that one cannot say that, if nothing existed, it would still be possible for anything to be: from nothing comes nothing. Of course, somethings exist and other things are possible, so there must be some necessary being which grounds the basis of the existence of all things, which is God (pp. 13, 14). Now, for Kant, what is possible is thinkable, and vice versa. (p. 14).
But if these claims are true, then if you deny God's existence, then there is nothing that grounds the possibility of anything, and so it would be possible that nothing exist: and so, possible that nothing is possible; if so, it would have to be thinkable, too: and so thinkable that nothing would be thinkable. If you think these conclusions are about as acceptable as saying that it is true that there are no truths, you're following the argument. God, who is the ground of all possibility and thought cannot fail to exist; hence it is not possible that nothing be possible, nor can it be thought that nothing is thinkable. But, naturalism denies the existence of God, and so is lead into these absurdities, which is why it must be rejected (p. 14). Now, Kant only concludes that God's existence must be believed in, or at least presupposed, lest thought become impossible. For him it was a separate matter whether God existed in mind-independent reality (pp. 14, 15).
Likewise, Kant thought he held that free will must be presupposed in order to engage in pure reason. Why is postulating free will necessary to get pure reason under way? Slagle comments that, for Kant, "Discursive thought cannot be explained purely in passive or receptive terms." Rather, what is needed is the ability to engage in a spontaneous act of conceptualization, something of which the mind needs to be aware of doing (p. 15).
What does this spontaneous act of conceptualization consist in? A grasp of the logical connections between premises and a conclusion. It is not enough that good reasons somehow shape our consequent belief; rather, these reasons must also be seen to be good reasons, and the mind conclude on the basis of this awareness. This is the opposite of the mind being compelled from outside of itself. Further, the process of reasoning logically cannot be reduced merely to causation such as that which began prior and external to the reasoning agent, or else we could make no distinction between valid and invalid inference: each would be the necessary effect of their respective causal processes (p. 16). So, in order to believe that my reasoning arrives at its conclusions validly and on the basis of good reasons I have to believe that I am free from external causes (p. 17).
Kant also argues against materialism, which for present purposes we can define as the thesis that it is possible to give a completely material account of thinking (p. 17). Kant's argument works equally well against eliminative materialism, reductive materialism, and non-reductive materialism: if material causality is the driving force behind all reasoning, then the propositional content of my beliefs and my awareness of these and their logical connections are irrelevant to why I adopt the conclusions that I do (p. 18). But surely this undermines any epistemic justification I might have for my beliefs, including my belief in materialism.
Kant also presages Thomas Nagel in arguing for the irreducibly subjective nature of reasoning: the illeminability of I think. For, the active power of reasoning that Kant argues is necessary for reasoning requires that there is a certain vantage point from which I grasps the meaning of premises and sees their logical relations. They will seem to be a certain way to me, and only as such can they function as good reasons in valid reasoning processes. But this first-person perspective doesn't fit into a materialist account of things, which is cashed out in objective, third-person terms. Hence, materialism must deny this first-person perspective which is necessary for reasoning, including the reasoning supposedly leading to materialism, to get off the ground, which is self-defeating (p. 19).
From this chapter, we can see several routes one can take the Skyhook down: normativity, subjectivity, self-origination are integral parts of reason. However, all of these are denied by naturalism and/or determinism.
P.S. I didn't add this in the main body of the essay, but it is worth noting. Grasping reasons as reasons is not the case of merely having another belief.