The Last Word (Chapter Two) (pt. 1)

The Last Word (Chapter Two) (pt. 1)

Nagel makes two significant points in this chapter. First, he decisively refutes total skepticism and universal subjectivism, the latter of which is the target of his book. Second, he sketches out the method by which he will defend particular domains of thought against relativist challenges. Along the way, he responds to certain subjectivist views and answers some objections (we will consider these in pt. 2).

At the beginning of the chapter, Nagel connects subjectivism with understanding thought from the outside. Being self-aware enough to entertain the idea that some of our beliefs might be the product of rationalization is an example of understanding (some) thoughts from the outside (i.e., outside of the content of the thoughts in question) (p. 13, 14).  It should be clear why subjectivism and understanding thought from the outside go together: the subjectivist must use such an external vantage point (viewing our thoughts as cultural artifacts, expressions peculiar to our psychology, etc.) in order to challenge the ostensible objectivity of our thoughts.

He immediately notes that this procedure of viewing thought from the outside has inherent limits. It is one thing to view certain thoughts from this external vantage point and even challenge their truth or objectivity, but another to to do this for all thought. In the former case we must rely on the truth and objectivity of certain principles and forms of thought and our conclusion aspires to describe how reality (and our relationship to it) actually is. Taking an external vantage point for all thought and concluding that this shows all of our thoughts to be subjective simply can't be done, for it has undermined its own foundation and what it purports to be is just an instance of the sort of thing that it denies is possible (p. 14)

Nagel apty states, "We cannot criticize some of our own claims of reason without employing reason at some other point to formulate and support those criticisms" (p. 15). He also shows this again in connection with Descartes' skepticism. Again, aptly stated, "Skepticism that is the product of an argument cannot be total," and skepticism that is not the product of an argument is worth nothing (p. 19).

So, even in the attempt to cast doubt on all belief or to relativize all belief we run up against some thoughts which we have to take as objectively true, and within which, or from which, all reasoning must take place. Thus, reason is defended! However, for all this we've not shown much about the content of reason: it "may be quite rich . . . or it may be very austere, limited to principles of logic and not much more" (p. 17). How can we find out which of these alternatives is true? The only way to find out is to scrutinize what we belief, why we hold these beliefs, and see what beliefs or forms of thought resist being relativized (p. 17). Moreover, we need to drop the notion that objectively true beliefs will be certain; they may be, or may be probable but the key factor that we should emphasize is that they aspire to universality (p. 18).

He also lays out principles for us to follow in this task, such as "one can't criticize the more fundamental with the less fundamental" (p. 21). You can't displace logic or arithmetic with anthropology or sociology (p. 22). Part of the reason is that these disciplines presuppose the objectivist of at least some logical and mathematical thoughts. But, as he makes clearer in later chapters, part of the reason is that the content of some of our, say, ethical or mathematical thoughts will just repudiate any attempt to relativize them. These forms of thought reveal their objectivity in virtue of their content and unavoidability (p. 24,26); think of the law of non-contradiction. Thus, we may still have good reason to take these principles and forms of thought as objective even if we are given some external criticism of them. Part of the reason for this, is that we must always ask if such a proposed external explanation of those beliefs makes it reasonable to reject or relativize those, say, ethical beliefs. But this will require that we go back to ethics and work out the answer to that question within ethics (p. 21). Again, he will say more on this in future chapters, so let this suffice for now.