The Last Word (Chapter Two) (pt. 2)

The Last Word (Chapter Two) (pt. 2)

Nagel makes two significant points in this chapter. First, he decisively refutes total skepticism and universal subjectivism, the latter of which is the target of his book. Second, he sketches out the method by which he will defend particular domains of thought against relativist challenges (we considered these in pt. 1). Along the way, he responds to certain subjectivist views and answers some objections (we will look at these now). 

He considers two subjectivist proposals: (1) reason as consensus, (2) reason as the outer edge of a contingent conceptual framework. Let's look at these in turn.

Certain philosophers regard ostensibly objective reason as merely those beliefs and forms of thought upon which certain groups of people are subjectively persuaded. Nagel quotes Sabina Lovibond to this effect: "the objectivity of an assertion or an argument is always at the same time something of which human beings (those human beings who call it 'objectively valid') are subjectively persuaded" (p. 28). Likewise, he notes others reject the idea that there is a reality beyond that about which there is consensus among a linguistic community (p. 28).

He responds to this position by noting that it is often "inconsistent with the very consensus on which they propose to 'ground' objectivity" (p. 29). For example, when mathematicians agree on certain claims they agree that they are true full stop (i.e., in an unqualified way) and would be true even if they did not agree on their truth. Hence what is agreed to is that X is objectively true (apart from such agreement). This reveals an important fact: consensus about, say, the Law of Noncontradiction is grounded in the objectivity of the proposition as disclosed by its content. Reason-as-consensus gets things backwards (p. 31). 

In case why the actual nature of consensus is a problem from the reason-as-consensus view is unclear, recall that that thesis is claiming that there is nothing more to truth or objectivity than that some group of people agree to it. But we find that about a whole range of items people agree that they are objectively true whether or not anyone agreed to them, and that there are additional objective truths which we don't yet know and might never know. This can no more be fit into the reason-as-consensus view as can the statement "the laws of my community specify that not everything that is wrong is illegal" be fit into a view that says "there is nothing more to wrongness than being contrary to the laws of my community" (p. 30).

The second subjectivist proposal he examines is that which views reason (the objective framework of thought) as relative to one's conceptual scheme; that is, reason are the aspects of thought within our conceptual scheme we have to regard as objective. From here this position stipulates that we can imagine thinking beings with different conceptual frameworks such that what is 'objective' in ours is not in theirs and vice versa; the end result of this is that nothing is absolutely objective, but only 'objective' given a certain conceptual scheme (p. 31).

Nagel's response to this is to double down on the fact that there are certain thoughts we cannot get outside of, even in the attempt to formulate this sort of scenario (p. 32); if we reject the truth or objectivity of these, we cannot even formulate this proposal. Further, we cannot regard our commitment to the objectivity of some of our thoughts and ways of thinking (say, simple logical truths) as merely a phenomenological fact about ourselves. If we are persuaded that they are objectively true (and how can we avoid being persuaded of the truth of the LNC?) we can't at the same time suppose that they are not objectively and universally valid. This conceptual-scheme-relative notion of reason would ask us to do just that. But "this is merely an instance of the impossibility of thinking 'It is true that I believe that p; but that is just a psychological fact about me; about the truth of p itself, I remain uncommitted' " (p. 32).

As I see it, Nagel responds to three objections to his claims. Let us say a brief word on these. 

"This response to subjectivism [that we must adjudicate it by reason] may appear to be simply question-begging." (p. 24)

Recall, his strategy is to return to reason. Since reason is what is being challenged, is it question-beginning to return to it and presuppose its objective validity? He answers that it is not, since the subjectivist is giving us a proposal about how things actually are, and must supply reasons. Hence the defense of reason by reason is mandated by the challenge itself (pp. 24, 25).

Nagel considers two similar objections (objections similar to each other, not to the one just described). The first is that our commitment to the objectivity of some of our beliefs and forms of thought is just a psychological fact about us (p. 16). The second is that, while their subjectivity cannot be said, shows itself in the way in which all argument and reason comes to an end, in judgments we find compelling (p. 33). Both of these objections concede that we simply can't help but think that reason's authority is independent of us (that some of our beliefs and forms of thought are universally valid). They differ in only the way they handle this fact. 

The first objection attempts to rebuff the conclusion that reason's authority is independent of our belief in its authority. The objective validity of reason is just an appearance and not part of reality. But the problem is that we can only make the division between what is real and what is a mere appearance if we have principles and methods of thinking that are true and universally valid (pp. 16, 17). I'd also add that this objection does nothing to undercut the criticism Nagel has made against general subjectivism, nor has it made any attempt to be rationally compelling; the same goes for all the subjectivist proposals and objections Nagel considers in this chapter.

The second objection goes like this, "Why doesn't that show only that we cannot say logic, for example, or ethics, is rooted in our natural, unquestioned practices, but that this nevertheless shows itself in the way in which arguments and justification come to an end, in judgments on which we naturally agree?" (p. 33) Afterall, we are talking about "our arguments, our thoughts, our reasoning" (p. 33). This objection parallels Wittgenstein's claim that the truth of solipsism can't be stated (since it is false in my language game) but is shown in the fact that however I talk about the world it will always be in my language game (pp. 33, 34).

The subjectivist presses their case because all justification seems to end in principles or forms of thought that we (individually or collectively) hold. However, this doesn't show that these principles have their authority because we treat them as such; in which case we or our recognition of these principles or forms of thought would have the last word (as the subjectivist says). That argument and justification comes to an end in our thinking (individually or collectively) doesn't mean that our thinking has the last word (and not the principles and forms of thought themselves). Rather, these principles or forms of thought or justifications must have the last word; even to recognize that argument and justification take place in our thinking and the attempt to derive some subjectivist conclusion from that must employ argument and justification in a way that shows their authority to be independent of the fact that we think them (p. 34).

"Why doesn't that show only that we cannot say logic, for example, or ethics, is rooted in our natural, unquestioned practices, but that this nevertheless shows itself in the way in which arguments and justification come to an end, in judgments on which we naturally agree?" (p. 33) Afterall, we are talking about "our arguments, our thoughts, our reasoning" (p. 33). This objective parallels Wittgenstein's claim that the truth of solipsism can't be stated (since it is false in my language game) but is shown in the fact that however I talk about the world it will always be in my language game (pp. 33, 34).

The subjectivist presses their case because all justification seems to end in principles or forms of thought that we (individually or collectively hold). However, this doesn't show that these principles have their authority because we treat them as such; in which case we or our recognition of these principles or forms of thought would have the last word. That argument and justification comes to an end in our thinking (individually or collectively) doesn't mean that our thinking has the last word (and not the principles and forms of thought themselves). Rather, these principles or forms of thought or justifications must have the last word; even to recognize that argument and justification take place in our thinking and the attempt to derive some subjectivist conclusion from that must employ argument and justification in a way that shows their authority to be independent of the fact that we think them (p. 34).

Nagel notes the fact that prevents an immediate inference from 'we think these thoughts' to 'our thinking them / we who think them have the last word' when he says, "If there were nonsubjective thoughts, someone would still have to think them. So the formula that simply notes this cannot be used to demonstrate that everything is based on our responses. A tautology with which all parties to a dispute must agree on cannot show that one of them is right" (p. 35). 

I think you can see that Nagel does an excellent job rebutting general subjectivism and charting a path for refuting it in particular domains of thought. We will see if he succeeds in the latter endeavour when we come to later chapters.